M 23-Feb Class discussion online (not in classroom)
about The Cold War (Chapters 7-8) (Katelyn McDonald)
— Note: Questions below, for discussion in comments (this thread).
W 25-Feb Sexton: Intro & 5 poems (2641-9)
& Plath: Intro & 8 poems (2698-10). (Andrea Morgan)
F 27-Feb Updike: “Separating” (2713-20) (Jason Adams)
& Creeley: 6 poems (2569-74)
M 23-Feb: Online discussion
about The Cold War (Chapters 7-8)
Note: Required participation to count for attendance. First post due by 1:55pm; second by 4pm. (Of course, you need not blog during class time, if you’ve posted earlier!) Also, posts can (should) be brief! ~50-100 words, (so please limit summary and avoid any tangents…)
In at least one (if not both) of your posts, address issue of Contrast within our experiment — we want to explicitly establish that from which we are diverging, in terms of “consensus discourse” and/or the doxa. (In other words, framing your responses into the context of our course/project, through the specific examples from McMahon.)
1st: Identify a specific event (or example) that illustrates and/or influences a decision. (briefly describe — consider the factors and “decision-making process” evident)
Then, pose a question that this example inspires, (i.e. your reaction, the question that you ask of the text).
2nd: (briefly responding to a classmate’s comment, addressing two of these Qs)
What mode of thinking is demonstrated in this example? (beyond obvious ideological position)
How does this relate to our understanding of this text as historical discourse? (i.e. what kind of example does it function as?)
Any myths that appear to have either influenced or to have sprung from this event/decision?
What new/further understanding of consensus or doxa can we derive through this example? (and what functions or effects of consensus discourse should we keep in mind as we proceed?)
Finally, rather than answer the original writer’s question, reply with a subsequent question.
Subsequently, you might take up any of these questions (literally) in your blog entry this week — not to simply answer, but to continue and/or elaborate our critical reading and interrogation, (in the speculative mode). The most important task for your blog entry in any case is to consider this category of Contrast — the mode of discourse{thought+expression} from which we (necessarily) seek to diverge; be sure to explicitly address, with whichever examples you cite.
ghink
American Doxa: Identity-Memory-Text 
I arrived in orlando at my grandfathers house about 3 hours ago. I read chapters 7&8 of the cold war yesterday, so already had a general understanding of what was going on. But instead of talking about directly what was occurring in the book, I would rather discuss the description my grandfathers girlfriend gave me of that time. She is a German immigrant that has been back and forth between here and Germany her whole life. She is in her 70s now and provided me with some unexpected information not mentioned in the book.
At dinner I simply asked her to describe the “cold war” between the 70s and 90s. One major point not directly mentioned in the book she mentioned was that in parts of the US people were scared that the Soviet Union was going to bring communism over here and it was going to take over. In fact she said there were quite a few people in russian populated towns that were promoting the spread of communism. Another interesting fact she talked about was that the people in citizens of russia were dirt poor at this time. She said there were women and children on the street trying to sell small bottles of vodka because they had nothing. Something else that really struck me was that in parts of germany people had no freedom, in fact the only thing they were free to do was swim nude in the local canals. She even up to 2004 there are people swimming nude in parts of Germany because that is the common “consensus” of what to do.
How much of the cold war is not documented or shared with others. Or how much did the citizens of Russia suffer because the country’s money was focused on technological advancement and competition with the US?
Comment by Ray Southern — 21 February 2009 @ 9:24 pm |
Dictionary.com
Word of the Day for Saturday, February 21, 2009
hermetic \hur-MET-ik\, adjective:
1. closed tightly; airtight
2. obscure; magical
cf. hermeneutics Origin:
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Comment by Gary Hink — 22 February 2009 @ 12:22 pm |
The Cold War ended because the Soviet leader, Gorbachev, decided that the “arms race” was self-defeating and how by enhancing political means instead of military means would boost the economy and help with the World depending on each other instead of fighting against one another. I began contemplating why Gorbachev made this decision to take the “high-road” would be the best option for not only the Soviet Union, but also for the United States? Also, why would he choose this “path” instead of fighting the US more?
Comment by Katelyn McDonald — 22 February 2009 @ 4:01 pm |
It seemed apparent to me after reading chapters 7 and 8 that neither the United States or the Soviet Union really wanted to establish a truce with one another. Detente was not brought on by either side opting for peace, but rather it was brought on by necessity. The Soviet Union was struggling to maintain the border with China and their declining economy and therefore sought peace with the U.S. to keep from overextending themselves. The United States was suffering economic effects; the repair for which demanded foreign peace. This made me wonder, with our current position overseas, are we not recreating some of the same situations for ourselves- specifically with regard to the economy?
Comment by Kristen Zemina — 22 February 2009 @ 10:51 pm |
in this cold war reading (7-8) the thing that stood out to me was McMahon discussion early on about “Detente” and how Russia rise to prominence began to affect it. McMahon talked about U.S and its need to set priority in terms of global endeavors. For example, how the vietnam war affected the country’s economy and image, and how that in turn hurt U.S growth as a nation. the question here is, how much longer can we maintain the homogenize view that we are the “beacon of hope” and “world protector” given our finite natural resources? At what point do we pull away from those ideology and simply do what’s in the best of our interest.
Comment by heminkay — 23 February 2009 @ 12:20 am |
1) this is in response to Ray southern post. this relate to text as an historical discourse because of two things. first, the cliche fear of communism is again reiterated here. second, the lack of the text in presenting the effect of the cold war on citizens of communist nation is something that we don’t really learn in our social paradigm that adds to development of homogenize thinking. also i agree with Ray, the “Red Scare” was something that the book failed to talk about, well up to this point anyway.
2)Ray really didn’t talk about a specific event, but i guess the myth that sprung is the fear of communism taking over and also the cliche of Russia as a very billigerent country that is constantly building nuclear weapons.
3) my subsequent question: why do we choose to ignore the effect of the cold war on Russian or European citizens? i mean you never seen a movie made about how horrible life is in russia because Krushchev is spending all the money on defense.
Comment by heminkay — 23 February 2009 @ 12:45 am |
What goes into making a decision? Let’s narrow this down a bit- what goes into making a decision such as the countless re-arming actions that Ronald Reagan took that eventually aided in the fall of the Soviet Union? First, let’s take a gander back to three terms prior: Nixon. Yes, he was a failure as a President, but he was the first to truly push (I fail to regard LBJ’s “efforts” in anything) for Detente in such a manner that there was hope for peace. (Salt I and II) However, the puzzling fact is that he was a Republican, as was the next President down the line, Ford. Both of these Presidents attempted to carry on the pseudo-Democratic concept of Detente, which eventually exploded during Carter’s presidency in 1979. However, instead of taking true action against the USSR, he was reluctant at first, and thus American conservatism took hold. Perhaps this was the first reason Reagan decided to take such an agressive edge to political affairs with the Soviet Union. The next decision had to come from his opinion, as stated on page 148 of the Soviets, “… born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life.” I would have to assume that he, as many other knew at this point, of the poor state of affairs for third world countries behind the Iron Curtain. These people were in severe need of help, and in an American Cowboy style of thinking, we wanted to be the good guys and saddle up, take the bad guys out, and save the town. In this case, East Europe. Perhaps this is what brought Reagan to bring such an overwhelming degree of force into his administration, his decision was rather brash, but it was effective. There are two ways to look at this in the realm of contrast, either Reagan was just being a classic Republican and Nixon was going against the grain, or Reagan was going against the grain of the previous three presidents. Either way, there is a definite sentiment that someone “broke the doxa”, the question is a matter of opinion, as it is political in nature- regardless, its up to you to decide.
Comment by Clark Roland — 23 February 2009 @ 12:55 am |
I found it interesting that through the entire course of the Cold War, Russia was considered a main “Superpower”. But after over 40 years of a buildup to an “inevitable war”, it suddenly collapsed and cast by the foreign policy wayside. It seems that something that caused so much tension would not disappear so easily. What made this happen? Was it the fact that the U.S. knew that without a stable economy, Russia was no longer a threat? The same thing happened with Germany. I suppose the difference here is that the Soviet Union was already a socialist nation and the US did not have to worry about communism filling the void because it was already there.
Comment by lmconway — 23 February 2009 @ 1:03 am |
(As I won’t be near a computer till well past 8pm tomorrow night, I will have to follow up my previous post with part two, which I will keep shorter. I couldn’t develop the first idea without the back-story.)
In response to Ray’s very intriguing personal story of his grandfather’s girlfriend, I would have to point out two distinct references: The first being that there are two sides to every coin, the second being that history is much like our pasteurization example of the Doxa, in a sense- you skim the fat off the top before you pasteurize it all down to a homogenized blend.
The first point- The concept of myth to us versus that of the Russians was/is rather…similar. Our paranoia of the spread of communism in some areas, while in others the desire to go stomp out communism wherever it was found is quite akin to the notions of spreading communism and the fear of American attack. Allowing to take history from a personal standpoint such as this really allows for a more “human” feel to the worries and goals both sides shared. The second point is related to the first in that we truly cannot understand history just reading it from some bland textbook-like material, we have to incorporate these forms of personal accounts or else history is just one event to the next skipping over the true “grout” that kept all of the massive events in place: the people’s stories. No, you cannot know them all, but even knowing a handful from each side vastly changes one’s personal view of history.
In a reverse-question to Ray’s response, I would have to ask if all of that history that is “left out” is omitted because it involves bitter struggles so much so that it is something that people wish to have buried into the “cracks” of history, never to really escape unless it must? Perhaps it is best that parts of history be omitted for the sake of those who lived through it, so that they must not relive it?
Comment by Clark Roland — 23 February 2009 @ 1:07 am |
The peace strived for by the Americans and Soviets at this time was a very thin illusion. Sure the nuclear arsenal was reduced, but it really does not take many nuculear weapons to decimate a nation (1000 will certainly do the job). The agreement between both nations to lower their arsenal was a domestic move not an international one. Citizens on both sides were beginning to panic. The politicians decided to calm their flock by altering the consensus that they were on the brink of way by making it look like peaceful steps were being made. It is frightning that this is kind of peace was and stil is regarded by the public as acceptible.
Comment by Tyler Welt — 23 February 2009 @ 8:47 am |
I like where you are going with your comment, lmconway. Why did we consider the Soviet Union a superpower, when in actuality they were rapidly imploding from internal presures. I may have missed it in the book, but the so called “Star Wars” space defense program (if you do not know here is a really quick reference: http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/intheblue ) is a great example of trying to compete in the final days of the arms race, which had elevated itself to fictional technology. If anyone remembers learning about this program, you may find it ironic that President Reagan was an actor before a politician. Is the term decided by overall size, nuclear prowess (is destroying the world 20 times over any different then destroying it once), economics, etc? Do the people who write high school history books get to decide?
Comment by biker2 — 23 February 2009 @ 9:33 am |
1. One specific event is the Cuban missile crises. This was the really close encounter with the arms race with Soviet Union. Then based on Mc Mahon states in the book about the SALT agreement and the reduction of missiles. This would be the direct result of stopping close encounters such as the Cuban missile crises from happening and promoting détente. President Carter was going to go through with it until the Soviet invaded Afghan. So even though the SALT agreement at first was stated now beneficial to the US they still were going to pass it in Congress. This is the first time that America was looking out for the greater good and not personal well being. The idea of détente springed from the primary protagonists, but when the fall of it happened we are kind of left blanked what did the American people think about what was going on? How did the Americans feel about their situation? Is this the whole homogenized view that we are only given the like “skim milk” of it, just what the Presidents(figurehead) actions are?
2. The United States I believe at all costs will spread its own resources thin to try secure something sure for the future. For example the economy is in shambles but we are over in the Middle East fighting. I think the reason for this is to protect its oil reserves and show the nations they are helping and are allies. So in the end it is doing what is best for America. The beacon of hope is definitely a “homogenized view” because you see the soldiers on TV that share candy out to the little children but what you don’t see as often is the soldiers that rape women or take advantage of the civilians. I think this reading is definitely all myth and homogenized views because we are not given any descriptions of personal understandings for example Mc Mahon states those who truly wanted reduction in arms race, but who is it? So is America even still a beacon of hope? Or a protector? All the failed attempts to protect its own economy, we are going on to the 2nd attempt? All those people that have recently got laid off do you think that they see America as a beacon of hope?
Comment by Saudia Ally — 23 February 2009 @ 9:53 am |
In response to Clark’s comment.
As he talked about the 3 presidents and their attempts to save the third world countries behind the iron curtain it occurred to me that third world countries “in front” of the iron curtain suffered as well. When we think about the countries that were in shambles during the Cold War we often neglect the ones that are closest to us. It is the consensus to think that only those countries who embraced the Soviet Union (whether by force or choice) suffered during the events that took place during the Cold War.
This made me think back on the history classes I took throughout high school. While we did spend a great deal of time focusing on the poor Eastern European countries and the Soviet block, we spent very little time discussing any other countries that struggled. This would mean that our history class was possibly more subjective than we would have thought. Was a huge piece of history neglected because it showed the U.S. in a bad light?
Comment by Kristen Zemina — 23 February 2009 @ 10:56 am |
Although the period of detente was had a peaceful beginning, it is not hard to see that the idea “détente” came about because fiscally the US and the Soviet Union could no longer support the conflict. At least for the US, peace negotiations and arms regulations, were not decisions, they were reactions to problems happening inside our own borders. Although Jimmy Carter was a great at peace talks with the Soviets, the economy struggled mightily while he was in office. Where at the beginning of the Cold War we saw both the US building up arms as quickly as possible, we see a shift (specifically on the US side) towards peace that is linked more to internal problems, than any sort of agreement in ideals with the Soviets.
Comment by carter louv — 23 February 2009 @ 11:11 am |
To me, what seemed most interesting during these chapters was the Reagan Doctrine. While Reagan’s policies avoided any actual conflict between Soviet and American troops, the U.S. had no problem assisting guerilla forces in their fights against the Soviets. This decision was met with criticism from the Soviets (obviously) and also the U.S.’s western allies. To me, the decision seems cowardly and sends a message of American exceptionalism. Isn’t this simply saying to the world that the lives of guerilla soldiers and innocent civilians are less important than those of American troops and that the U.S. will only help you to its own immediate benefit?
Comment by Andrea Morgan — 23 February 2009 @ 11:14 am |
In response to Tyler’s post: The decisions by U.S. and Soviet leaders illustrate an almost duplicitous thinking. They wanted to show concern for the “concensus” of panic within their respective countries, but still pose a real threat to one another. The myth here is that danger/threat of harm for your enemy does not equate to the same for yourself. The populations of both countries seemed to buy into this myth and the show of reducing nuclear arsenals. This decision demonstrates that concensus does not equate to truth. Though, after the reduction of the nuclear arsenals, the populations of the United States and the U.S.S.R. likely felt a sense of relief or more security, that did not reduce the real threat that the remaining nuclear weapons posed for both nations.
Comment by Andrea Morgan — 23 February 2009 @ 11:26 am |
The end of the cold war was not brought upon by desire to sever the hostility between the nations, it was because the two nations could not honestly afford to keep it going. The wars in Vietnam had caused the US defense budget to go over their intended amount, and caused them to need to prioritize. Their compromises were due to necessity. Gorbachav chose to end the Arms Race as opposed to fighting the US more because it just didn’t make sense to continue to spend money, that neither country had, to make nuclear weapons. If they had chosen to continue, it would be like shooting their own self in the foot by continuing to burden their strapped economy.
Comment by rastipe — 23 February 2009 @ 12:00 pm |
In response to Lauren’s question, I believe that our worry over the Soviet Union did fall to the side because indeed their limited budget did make them less of a threat. They were beginning to desire a severing of the hostile acts toward each other, and wanting to stop the fighting. The Soviet’s lessening of their military force and their nuclear weapons reduced our care of them even more.
So, Why did it take so long for the Soviet Union to take this stance. Their economy had been in decline for the later part of the war, so why was it only when Gorbachev came to power that the action was finally taken?
Comment by rastipe — 23 February 2009 @ 12:12 pm |
A response to doxa?
McMahon as well as the litany of high school and college teachers and most America have accepted the given idea that the cold war ended as a result of Ronald Regan’s foreign policy in concert with the reforms of Soviet Premier Gorbachev. Is it possible that the explanation of the collapse by pointing to Regan’s boom in war spending is false? What were Gorbachev’s real goals at home and abroad? The collapse may have stemmed from economics but not just because of the eight or so Regan years. The soviet Union had been competing out of their class since the end of the second world war. Their population, cities, industry, agriculture and virtually every aspect and measurable indicator about a state was rocked to the point of collapse by Nazi invasion starting in 1941. The American economy and society on the other hand witnessed an incredible boom in production, money saved and saw almost no physical damage during our involvement in world war 2. By 1944 America was outproducing the rest of the world combined in war material. Immediately after the war the soviets jumped in this competition with us and spent decades trying to catch up and prove to the world they were equal. In other words they were competing against an economy as strong as the rest of the world after 1/3 of their most profitable territory and industry had been decimated by war. This meant huge sums of money and effort on war technology, and state efforts to increase industry and agriculture efficiency. It is more likely that the collapse was building ever since the start of the cold war because of the ineffective style of soviet government along with the unrealistic goal of matching American technology and industry in the short run.
This being said what was Gorbachevs real goals. It appears unlikely that he wanted to disband the soviet union and turn it into the next America. One does not get to be premier of the Soviet Union nor selected for leadership by the Politburo without believing in communism. Gorbachev more likely wanted some reform politically and economically but was overtaken by the poor circumstances that had accumulated from decades of repressive government and an economy still recovering from war trying to compete way out of their class. Both men were in the right place at the right time lets not give either too much credit especially Regan.
Comment by david224 — 23 February 2009 @ 1:10 pm |
Part One: A Decision. The text makes a strong case that President Reagan took the most hard nosed approach to communism and the arms race. Yet Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to meet five times in order to propose ground rules for the arms/space race. Do we from a biased historical perspective give the two excessive or not enough credit for their efforts? Do we as Americans see Reagan as the town bully who never backed down or Gorbachev as the opposite? From all my history lessons and lectures this is the impression I always formed.
Comment by biker2 — 23 February 2009 @ 1:57 pm |
As McMahon pointed out, the event that truly heralded the end of detente in the Cold War was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. For nearly two decades, a succession of Western leaders had been engaged in a strategy of appeasing the Eastern bloc in an attempt to curb the Soviet expansionist ambitions. It could be argued that the Johnson and Carter administrations subscribed most strongly to this strategy out of a misguided belief that the Soviets would give up their stated goals in exchange for diplomatic concessions and a guaranteed place of power within the international community. Nixon accepted this course in the short term in order to focus on stabilizing the rapidly deteriorating situation in China, and Ford carried this on during his short administration. Regardless of personal motive, the detente period lasted until the Soviets irrevocably broke the unofficial truce by invading Afghanistan, confirming that no amount of appeasement could satisfy the imperial appetite of the Kremlin. This geopolitical turmoil, combined with the socioeconomic problems on the domestic front, allowed Ronald Reagan to win the presidency and enact a doctrine that led directly to the defeat of the Soviet Union. Reagan had the advantage of familiarity with the American people, as well as an established track record of warning against the dangers of socialism and the Soviet threat which went back to even before his support of Barry Goldwater in 1964. My question is this: did the detente period merely prolong the Cold War, which could have been won 10-15 years earlier had the United States pushed the Soviets to the economic breaking point at first opportunity, or did the detente period, although doomed to failure, allow the United States to recover strength while exhausting the Soviets before making the final push?
Comment by gbcarter — 23 February 2009 @ 1:58 pm |
While writing my post, I was struck by the similarities between the events of and leading up to 1979 and those of 1939. A string of Western leaders engaged in a prolonged period of negotiating with and appeasing an avowedly anti-Western regime, up until said regime invaded another country in spite of previous concessions; this led directly to the replacement of the leaders in the West with much more effective chiefs who took a much firmer stance on the threat across from them. Also, in my question concerning the utility of the detente period I saw a parallel to World War II, where it has been debated whether the delay of the war for much of the 1930s allowed the United States to recover from the Great Depression enough to effectively wage war on the Axis, or if an earlier war would have stimulated the industrial rebound of the United States that much faster.
Comment by gbcarter — 23 February 2009 @ 2:05 pm |
(Internet trouble, sorry I’m late!)…After reading these two chapters, what mainly stands out is how the relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviets came to be. It just seems like both superpowers seemed relentless on becoming the dominant country, but at the end of the day, both countries felt that even though they did not want to ease tensions, it was better for everyone if they did. Both economies were declining. For the U.S. this was because of a lack of finances drained by the vietnam war, and for the Soviets, they felt that to keep going in this “nuclear arms race” would surely be unsustainable in the long run. These are definitely not the only reasons, which makes me wonder, do you think there were any hidden agendas for either side to agree on the detente, other than the ones we know about?
Comment by David Lewis — 23 February 2009 @ 2:30 pm |
Much of the focus of these later chapters is on the strides that were taken by the Reagan administration towards the ending of the Cold war. I feel that to a large degree, the end of the Cold War conflict between the two superpowers was already coming to its inevitable end. The economy in the Soviet Union could not support the financial demands of competition with the United States. In addition to the conflict with the United States, the USSR also had to worry about their relations with their hostile neighbor, China. How much did the actions take by the Carter and Reagan administration really influence the end of the Cold War? Would it have brought itself naturally to an end or were these actions necessary?
Comment by cmascoe — 23 February 2009 @ 2:34 pm |
Part II In response to Andrea’s post:
She talks about how the Reagan doctrine helped avoid any actual conflict between the U.S. and the Soviets, but how we still assisted the guerilla forces against the Soviets. In my opinion, this type of thinking was considered rational by the U.S. In any war, the type of thinking is “better you, than me”. We as Americans have definitely heard that phrase a few times in our life. Our government had no problem helping non-American troops fight the Soviets because it meant losing less of our soldiers. It may not be the right thing, but it was the rational thing at the time. Doing what is “rational” is pretty much the consensus in American society today, so you can see that even back then, the general consensus was similar if not the same. Through this example, we can further look into the consensus of rational thinking and that American will do what is necessary to win a war, or be the “top dog” as long as the benefits outweigh the costs…My answer to her question is simply, yes, and I will ask, to what extent will we (the U.S.) be alright with sacrificing innocent lives, and the lives of other soldiers in order to benefit this country, and how did it become this way?
Comment by David Lewis — 23 February 2009 @ 2:51 pm |
In respsonse to gbcarters comment, I would have to say that both of the countries were acting on their own imperialistic goals. Both countries were trying to spread their own mode of government (democracy vs. communism). In assisting Afghanistan, the United States was trying to secure their own interests in that region. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, their actions were not that dissimilar to the United States, they were trying to secure their interests in the Middle East.
Comment by cmascoe — 23 February 2009 @ 2:53 pm |
In response to Ray’s Post, I believe that there are a lot of things that went undocumented during the Cold War in the Soviet Union. The things that we read or hear about now only scratches the surface of the activities of what when on there. This book captures a detailed but consensus view/information of what went on. There’s no vehicle or images that help invoke any sort of feeling towards what people were going through at the time. In order to get a more specific and true ideas of how people were treated, one must get those personal stories from the people who lived in the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. And of course with the Soviet government out to accomplish what they thought was important, the average citizen was going to suffer. When money is thrown into the military and technological advancements only to compete with other nations, the people will get the short end of the stick because none of it benefits them.
Comment by ryang87 — 23 February 2009 @ 3:19 pm |
David alluded to the notion of right and wrong in war. It is difficult to see if one side is right and the other is wrong, it may be more important to realize that all matters of war are simply disputes between view points. America did support non-American troops, and if the question was posed to a Soviet at the time it is likly they would believe this action to be “wrong”. However, if asking one of the soltiers fighting the soviets who recieved aid, it is likly that they would agree with America’s decision. That said, the soldiers in question belong to the so called “third world”. To what extent did the third world play a role in the cold war and how does this oppose the notion of first world surpemecy?
Comment by Tyler Welt — 23 February 2009 @ 3:22 pm |
Response to cmascoe;
The notion that is expressed in this response, is one that avoids consensus thinking, and questions the myths that surrounded the Cold War. How much credit should be given to Reagan for the end of the Cold War? When looking at the economic situation within the US and the Soviet Union during this time, we see another reason for a stall in the Cold War. Did the cold war end in an illusion peace and good relations simply because neither country could afford to continue? From these questions we might come to understand that perhaps we did not see an example of heroic leadership, but just simply witnessed the natural progression in a conflict?
Comment by carter louv — 23 February 2009 @ 3:34 pm |
I think Dave’s analysis of Gorbachev’s motivation in dealing with his perestroika reforms is pretty accurate. Often we see Gorbachev as the leader that boldly decided to change the way the Communist Party ran the Soviet Union and helped to end the Cold War peacefully; however, we can’t ignore the fact that the man had risen to power through decades under leaders like Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, and was just as committed to the supremacy of the Soviet Union as any of them. Gorbachev’s recognition of the economic problems within his country was the catalyst for him trying to change how the system was organized, but those reforms inevitably led to the downfall of the Soviet political structure, as Communism demonstrably cannot remain in power without greatly restricting socioeconomic liberties. Gorbachev’s contribution to the collapse of the Soviet Union was an unintended but unavoidable effect of necessary changes within the system. This downward spiral was certainly sped up by the American policies during the Reagan administration, but it was inevitable and would have happened with no outside influence in any case. I guess that raises the hypothetical question of what would have happened if America had not reacted to any Soviet aggression outside defending the United States, and allowed the socialist revolutions to run their course without particularly trying to resist the spread of socialism abroad?
Comment by gbcarter — 23 February 2009 @ 4:06 pm |
(I just had one of those “Oh crap I forgot” moments.) But in response to Carter’s comment, I think there is more to the end of the Cold War than just the imperialistic side (although that was a very large factor). Many things have to be taken into account, especially the economic side of things. At some point, the “war” became less about communism vs. democracy and became more about how each nation could survive without their economic base crumbling (as the Soviet’s did).
Comment by lmconway — 24 February 2009 @ 8:03 pm |